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Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 8 (Mar. 01, 2018)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: DEATH SENTENCE APPEAL 
 
Summary 
The Nevada Supreme Court determined that a judgment of conviction, pursuant to 
a jury verdict, of one count each of conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary while in 
possession of a deadly weapon and two counts each of robbery with the use of a deadly 
weapon and murder with the use of a deadly weapon, commands a death sentence.  
 
Background 
On June 8, 2009, Brian Hudson and Paul Stephens were robbed and found 
murdered in an apartment they shared. A witness who lived in the victims’ same 
apartment complex told law enforcement that she saw two men, one with light skin and 
one with darker skin, near the scene around the time of the murders. Another witness said 
that, after hearing gunshots, he saw a red truck speed away from the complex. 
During their post-crime investigation, detectives learned that the victims' credit 
cards were used at various locations. After obtaining surveillance videos from those 
locations, the detectives identified a potential suspect and a vehicle that he was driving, 
that they later determined to be a rental car. Following a search of rental car records, the 
detectives were led to Ralph Jeremias, who matched the person from the surveillance 
footage.  
Thereafter, one of the witnesses from the apartment complex identified Jeremias 
as the darker-skinned man that she had seen the night of the murders. Additionally, once 
detectives learned that that Jeremias' friend, Carlos Zapata, drove a red truck, the other 
crime-scene witness identified the vehicle as that which had left the complex after the 
shooting.  
 Concluding that Jeremias committed the murders in the course of a robbery that 
he planned with Zapata and a third individual, Ivan Rios, each of the men were separately 
charged for their roles in the crime. Zapata pleaded guilty and testified on behalf of the 
prosecution at Jeremias' trial, and Rios was ultimately acquitted.   
Testifying in his own defense at trial, Jeremias admitted that he was in the 
victims' apartment the night of the murder and that he stole their property, but he denied 
any involvement in their deaths. The jury found Jeremias guilty of conspiracy to commit 
robbery, burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon, two counts of robbery with the 
use of a deadly weapon, and two counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly 
weapon.  
Resultantly, the jury imposed a death sentence for each murder and unanimously 
concluded that Jeremias’ alleged mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances: (1) the murders were committed in the course of a robbery, 
(2) the murders were committed to prevent a lawful arrest, and (3) Jeremias was 
convicted of more than one murder. Jeremias appealed. 
 
  																																																								
1  By Maliq Kendricks. 
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Discussion 
 
Exclusion of Jeremias' family from the courtroom during jury selection 
 
On appeal, Jeremias first contended that the district court violated his right to a 
public trial by excluding his family from the courtroom during voir dire with the pretext 
that there was limited seating space. Jeremias based his argument on precedent, which 
decrees that courts cannot rely on inadequate reasons, such as limited seating space, to 
close its proceedings to the public, without considering reasonable alternatives. 2 
Furthermore, in the event that a court does so, a structural error is committed, warranting 
automatic reversal and remand for a new trial.3 The Court concluded, however, that 
because Jeremias did not object to the closed proceedings at trial, he failed to preserve the 
structural error and forfeited his right to assert it on appeal.  
Nonetheless, because Nevada law provides a mechanism for an appellant to seek 
review of an error he forfeited,4  the Court conducted a ‘forfeited error’ analysis, 
considering whether: (1) there was an "error"; (2) the error was "plain," meaning that it 
was clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record; and (3) the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights.5 Here, the Court assumed Jeremias satisfied 
the first two elements under the ‘forfeited error’ analysis, because the district court closed 
the courtroom to members of the public (his family) for an inadequate reason (courtroom 
congestion) without balancing other interests or exploring reasonable alternatives. 
As to the third element, and through examining precedent, the Court found that 
Jeremias had failed to establish that the exclusion of his family for a small portion of voir 
dire had prejudiced him or rendered his trial unfair. Accordingly, his forfeited error was 
only trivial, not having caused him “actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice,”6 and 
thus, his substantial rights were not violated. Furthermore, the Court held that because 
Jeremias failed to object, his forfeited error could be seen as intentional and that 
correcting his error under the circumstances would encourage future defendants who are 
aware their rights are being violated to do nothing to prevent it, which would resultantly 
“erode confidence in the judiciary and undermine the integrity of the criminal justice 
system.” 
 
Questioning of Zapata 
 
Second, Jeremias contended that reversal was warranted because the State did not 
follow correct procedures to refresh Zapata's recollection during his testimony. After 
acknowledging that the prosecutor erred in referring Zapata to a transcript to read aloud 
from instead of testifying from his memory, without first establishing that Zapata's 
memory needed refreshing, the Court determined that the district court erred in 
overruling Jeremias’ objections to both occurrences. Nonetheless, because Zapata 
																																																								
2  Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 216 (2010).  
3  Id.  
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.602 (1967). 
5  Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003). 
6  Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1190, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008). 
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directly inculpated Jeremias, in the portions of his testimony where he was not 
inappropriately guided, the Court held that the error was harmless.  
 
Testimony of a substitute coroner 
 
Third, Jeremias contended that reversal was warranted because the district court 
violated his right to confront an adverse witness by permitting the testimony of a coroner 
who had not conducted the victims' autopsies. The Court concluded that because the 
substitute coroner testified about independent conclusions that she made based on 
photographs from the victims' autopsies, her testimony did not violate the Confrontation 
Clause, and thus Jeremias’ claim failed.  
 
Testimony regarding plastic fragments  
  
Fourth, Jeremias contended that reversal was warranted because the district court 
abused its discretion by allowing law enforcement members to testify about plastic 
fragments found strewn about the crime scene without first being qualified as experts. 
The Court found that no relief was warranted for his claim despite Jeremias’ objections 
on this basis at trial, because he had not “lodge[d] objections to the specific portions of 
the testimony that he believed required an expert,” at trial or on appeal.  
 
Video of Jeremias' interrogation 
 
Fifth, Jeremias contended that his right to confrontation was violated when the 
district court overruled his objection to the State’s motion to admit a video recording of 
his interrogation, because the overruling allowed the jury to take the video into 
deliberations without first playing it in open court. The Court found that because the 
video was admitted into evidence and Jeremias failed to demonstrate how its admittance 
prejudiced his substantial rights, no relief was warranted for his claim.  
 
Reasonable doubt instruction 
 
 Sixth, Jeremias contended that reversal was warranted because the district court 
erred by giving a reasonable doubt instruction to the jury that stated that the State bore 
the burden of proving every "material element" of the crime, without actually defining 
what constitutes a material element. Nonetheless, Jeremias conceded that his claim failed 
under precedent,7 and argued that Burnside should be overruled. The Court declined to 
reconsider its precedent and held that no relief was warranted for Jeremias’ claim. 
 
Challenge to an aggravating circumstance 
 
Seventh, Jeremias contended that reversal was warranted because the aggravating 
circumstance—that he committed the murder to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest pursuant 																																																								
7  Burnside v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 40, 352 P.3d 627, 638 (2015) (holding that the "material element" 
language is superfluous and should be omitted in future cases, but is not so misleading or confusing to 
warrant reversal). 
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to NRS 200.033W—was unconstitutional. The Court reiterated that NRS 200.033W 
“does not require an arrest to be imminent, and the aggravating circumstance applies 
when the facts indicate that a defendant killed the victim because the defendant 
committed a crime and the victim could identify him if he were left alive,”8 as such there 
was no reason to reconsider firmly established precedent.  
 
Other penalty-phase claims 
 
Eighth, in seeking reversal, Jeremias raised three challenges to his penalty phase 
and claimed that: (1) the district court violated his rights to confrontation and notice by 
admitting Rios' statements to law enforcement; (2) the district court violated his Second 
Amendment right to bear arms by admitting evidence that he was found in possession of 
firearms during several arrests; and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during the 
penalty phase. The Court disregarded Jeremias’ first two challenges, on the grounds that 
he failed to demonstrate plain error that affected his substantial rights.  
As to Jeremias’ third challenge, regarding the penalty phase, he raised two 
arguments. First, Jeremias contended that the prosecutor's line of questioning of a 
defense-witness on cross-examination was misleading and constituted as prosecutor 
misconduct. Although the Court noted that it disapproved of the prosecutor’s various 
remarks during cross-examination, it ultimately determined that the prosecutor’s 
questioning did not violate Jeremias’ substantial rights.  
Also, Jeremias contended that the prosecutor’s closing remarks during rebuttal 
argument were improper. Here, the Court concluded that the prosecutor’s remarks did not 
affect the outcome of the proceeding, and therefore, Jeremias failed to demonstrate plain 
error affecting his substantial rights that could result in reversal of his death sentences. 
 
Instruction regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstance  
 
Ninth, Jeremias contended that the district court’s jury instruction, regarding the 
weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances, was unconstitutional and 
warranted reversal because it did not specify that the aggravating circumstances had to 
outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Determining that 
Jeremias structured his argument on his misinterpretation of precedent, the Court rejected 
his claim and clarified that a defendant is death-eligible so long as the jury finds the 
elements of first-degree murder and the existence of one or more aggravating 
circumstances.9 The Court further explained that once the State has proven first-degree 
murder and one statutorily-defined aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, 
each juror is tasked with determining whether to impose a death sentence.10  
 
Nevada's death penalty scheme  
 
																																																								
8  E.g., Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 793–94, 121 P.3d 567, 576–77 (2005). 
9  Lisle v. State, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 39, 351 P.3d 725, 732 (2015), alteration in original (quoting Sawyer v. 
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 343 (1992).  
10  Id.  
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Tenth, Jeremias contended that reversal was warranted because Nevada’s death 
penalty scheme was unconstitutional. Jeremias premised his argument on three grounds, 
that the death penalty: (1) does not adequately narrow the class of persons eligible for the 
death penalty; (2) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) fails to provide 
executive clemency. Concluding that Jeremias’ first claim was a generalized assertion, 
his second was unsupported by any cogent argument or authority, and his third was 
irrelevant, the Court dismissed each of Jeremias’ contentions.  
 
Cumulative error  
 
Eleventh, Jeremias contended that reversal was warranted because cumulative 
error deprived him of due process. The Court explained that although it identified several 
arguable errors made by the district court, each occurred at different portions of the 
proceedings. Resultantly, the Court rejected Jeremias’ claim because he proffered no 
explanation as to whether, or how, the Court should cumulate errors across different 
phases of a criminal trial. 
 
Mandatory review of Jeremias' death sentences  
 
 Finally, the Court conducted its review of the death sentence as required by NRS 
177.055(2). The Court considered whether: (1) the evidence of the case supported the 
aggravating circumstances; (2) the verdict of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor; and (3) the death sentence was excessive 
considering the defendant and his committed crime. Factors (1) and (2) were answered in 
the affirmative. As to factor (3), the Court concluded that although Jeremias was 
relatively young at the time of the crime, the evidence reflected his advance planning and 
cold, deliberate calculation to kill two people who he claimed were his friends. Thus, the 
death sentences imposed by the lower court were supported by the Court’s review of the 
record. 
 
Conclusion 
  
The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Ralph Jeremias’ entire appeal, affirming the 
lower court’s death sentence.  
 
 
 	
